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This Monday (9 February 2009), Kent Police arrested a man in Sheffield under the Serious Crime Act 2007 in relation to the recent Indymedia server seizure. His home was raided, all computer equipment and related papers taken. He was released after eight hours. The person had neither technical, administrative nor editorial access to the Indymedia UK website. He was only associated to the project by hosting its server.
The arrest took place under Section 44-46 of the Serious Crime Act, which was passed into law on 1st October 2008 to combat serious international crime like drug trafficking, prostitution, money laundering and armed robbery. Sections 44-46 refer to “encouraging or assisting offences”.
Kent police claim that they are after the IP address of the poster of two anonymous comments to a report about a recent animal liberation court case, which included personal details of the Judge. The IP address of the poster is not stored as Indymedia does not log IP addresses. This was acknowledged by British Transport Police in 2005, after the Bristol IMC server seizure.
For the police to arrest the person who happened to sign the contract for server hosting, is sheer intimidation, in light of Indymedia’s openly stated policy of no IP logging.
With the implementation of the EU Data Retention Directive in March 2009, the UK government attempts to turn every internet service provider in the country into part of the law enforcement apparatus. This legislation will provide a legal basis to track, intimidate, harass, and arrest people who are doing valuable and necessary work for social change, for example as peace activists, campaigners for economic and social justice or against police brutality.
The present intimidation of the open publishing alternative news platform Indymedia will have serious implications for anyone running a server in the UK which allows user contributions – blogs, social networking sites, wikis. This is an attempt to close down sites that respect the privacy of their contributors, pure and simple.
On 22 January 2009 an Indymedia server was seized by the police in Manchester on the behest of Kent police who claimed to be investigating a post about the recent Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty trial. The police stated that they wanted the IP addresses relating to specific posters but Indymedia assured them and the sites readers that no such data was ever retained.
The assurances did little to quell unease among some site users and it quickly became apparent that while such assurances were effectively correct there was pertinent information being kept secret. The strap line on the top of this sites web pages asserts that Indymedia is a “network of individuals, independent and alternative media activists and organisations, offering grassroots, non-corporate, non-commercial coverage of important social and political issues.
” The line used on the UK site leaves out part of the messaging included on some other sites in the Indymedia network which assures readers that indymedia is a “democratic media outlet for the creation of radical, accurate, and passionate tellings of truth.” That passion for the truth appears to be missing from the IMC UK ‘united kollectives’ as anymore following the various threads covering this story can attest. Repeatedly over the last few days, comments containing vital information, warnings and advice regarding security for the sites users have been hidden by the sites admins in a totally unaccountable fashion.
When an article is hidden from the UK newswire, the act is meant to be reported to a publicly archived mailing list called imc-uk-moderation. If you visit the archive you can in theory see what has been hidden and why but recently at least one admin admitted he’d not been bothering to do this and it was also revealed that automatic filters set up by admins were responsible for over 800 hidden articles last year alone with no notification to the list. According to documentation on site policy on the docs.indymedia.org site, moderation of comments is also meant to be reported to the list but there is a kind of “unwritten consensus on some types of comment which probably don’t need notification”. Such exclusions include “mindless abuse, e.g. one-liners with “Kill all the ***”, or “Indymedia sucks” and “spam comments unrelated to the actual content of the article”. However when you check the comments that are being hidden without notification (the vast majority by a long shot) many certainly don’t fall into those categories.
The policy document goes on to give the following advice to admins, “It’s important you don’t give in to the temptation of hiding comments that you violently disagree with, but don’t really breach the editorial guidelines. Before hiding a comment, it’s a good idea to ask yourself ‘is this really against the guidelines, or am I just angry at the author for saying something so stupid?’
We don’t have the right to censor comments simply because we disagree with them.” IMC UK claims the following among the principles in its mission statement: a focus on grassroots politics, actions and campaigns; to reject all systems of domination and discrimination; and to work on a non-hierarchical basis. However among the posts the current admins have been hiding were call outs to the users to get involved in re-domocrasising the project by attending what should be open meetings of the collectives. And how open are these meetings, if you can even find information on where and when they met? Another (hidden) post revealed that the London collective was closing ranks and making it’s meeting even more private. What is this dark secret that must be hidden at any costs?
Apparently it is nothing more than the fact that the admin interface provides a feature that allows IP addresses of recent posts to captured for the purpose of creating filters against unwanted posters. Is it so important that this should be hidden even if it means sacrificing transparency and the trust of the site users? So important that it is worth the astonishingly extreme of purging information from indymedias public archives going back almost six years in a futile attempt at a coverup? That such a facility exists is no surprise, it’s pretty much essential to maintaining the integrity of publishing platform, especially one which operates without user registration. What is surprising is that an organisation proporting to care about user security would go to such lengths to keep their users in the dark, especially surprising from an organsation which aspires to openness and horizontality.
We need to trust indymedia, not to be infallible but at least to tell the truth. We can cope with security risks when we are aware of them but to be placated with half truths and be cut down from discussing the issues, that’s just not on. Quoting a hidden comment, “Lets defend indymedia, defend ourselves – against not just the intimidation and threats of the state against our infrastructure but also against those among us who are bring shame down on all of us. We urgently need to hold these people to account as our enemies are having a field day and the long it festers the longer it will take to heal the rifts.” Born on the streets of Seattle in 1999, the indymedia project is approaching it’s tenth anniversary.
It would seem that this year would be a good time to assess its strengths and weaknesses, before either reinvigorating the project or building something stronger and better in its ashes as we move into what premisses to be the most significant period of social struggle this planet has ever seen. Man arrested in Indymedia animal extremism probe:
View all posts, visible or hidden : http://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/viewallposts.html